De Donder, Philippe and Ambec, Stefan (2021) Environmental Policy with Green Consumerism. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.111.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102584


Is green consumerism beneficial to the environment and the economy? To shed light on this question, we study the political economy of environmental regulations in a model with neutral and green consumers where the latter derive some warm glow from buying a good of higher environmental quality produced by a profit-maximizing monopoly,
while the good bought by neutral consumers is provided by a competitive fringe. Consumers unanimously vote for a standard set at a lower than first-best level, or for a tax delivering the first-best environmental protection level. Despite its under-provision of environmental protection, the standard dominates the tax from a welfare perspective due to its higher productive efficiency, i.e., a smaller gap between the environmental qualities of the two goods supplied. In stark contrast, voters unanimously prefer a tax to a standard when the willingness to pay for greener goods is small enough.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: December 2021
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Amsterdam
Uncontrolled Keywords: environmental regulation,, corporate social responsibility, green consumerism, product differentiation, tax, standard, green label, political economy.
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 05 Jan 2022 17:35
Last Modified: 05 Jan 2022 17:35
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