Azam, Jean-Paul (2010) Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated, and What to Do About It. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-230, Toulouse

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Abstract

This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce terrorism under some parameter restrictions.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: December 2010
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Terrorism – Education – Development, Terrorisme – Education – Développement
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:03
Last Modified: 29 Jan 2024 10:03
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:24339
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3568

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