Azam, Jean-Paul (2012) Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated, and What to Do About It. Public Choice, vol. 153 (n° 3-4). pp. 357-373.

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Identification Number : 10.1007/s11127-011-9798-7


This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively
high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential
students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields
a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The
comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how
economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce
terrorism under some parameter restrictions.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: December 2012
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Terrorism, Education, Development
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:19
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2024 10:07
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