Azam, Jean-Paul
(2012)
Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated, and What to Do About It.
Public Choice, vol. 153 (n° 3-4).
pp. 357-373.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively
high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential
students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields
a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The
comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how
economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce
terrorism under some parameter restrictions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2012 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Terrorism, Education, Development |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:19 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Jan 2024 10:07 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:24356 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15129 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated, and What to Do About It. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:03)
- Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated, and What to Do About It. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:19) [Currently Displayed]

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