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Yamashita, Takuro
(2018)
Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information.
TSE Working Paper, n. 18-937, Toulouse
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Abstract
This paper considers auction environments with a (possibly correlated) common prior over bidders' values, where each bidder may have additional information (e.g., through information acquisition). Under certain conditions, we characterize the optimal mechanisms in terms of the expected revenue that is guaranteed given whatever additional information is available to the bidders. Even if the values are correlated,we do not necessarily have full-surplus extraction, and moreover, the optimal mechanism resembles those in the independently distributed cases. Specifically, we show that (i) a second-price auction is optimal among all the efficient mechanisms, and (ii) it is rate-optimal among all the mechanisms.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2018 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Mechanism design, Auction, Correlated private information, Information acquisition, Revenue guarantee |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jul 2018 07:32 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:58 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32880 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26151 |
