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Jullien, Bruno
, Reisinger, Markus and Rey, Patrick
(2018)
Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition.
Economics Letters, vol. 169.
pp. 31-34.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tariffs, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2018 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Amsterdam. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Foreclosure, Vertical Contracting, Customer Segments, Downstream Competition |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection K21 - Antitrust Law L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2018 15:27 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Jun 2021 10:11 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32737 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26097 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Vertical Foreclosure and Multi-Segment Competition. (deposited 17 Apr 2018 08:10)
- Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition. (deposited 22 Jun 2018 15:27) [Currently Displayed]
