Jullien, Bruno, Reisinger, Markus and Rey, Patrick (2017) Vertical Foreclosure and Multi-Segment Competition. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-876, Toulouse

There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of wp_tse_876.pdf]
Download (238kB) | Preview


This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tari¤s, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 15 December 2017
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Foreclosure, Vertical Contracting, Customer Segments, Downstream Competition
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
K21 - Antitrust Law
L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 17 Apr 2018 08:10
Last Modified: 29 Jun 2021 09:19
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32305
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25799

Available Versions of this Item

View Item


Downloads per month over past year