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Lefouili, Yassine
and Pinho, Joana
(2018)
Collusion between two-sided platforms.
TSE Working Paper, n. 18-894, Toulouse
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Abstract
We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | February 2018 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Collusion, Two-sided markets, Cross-group externalities |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Apr 2018 11:10 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Jun 2021 15:50 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32485 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25859 |
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