Lefouili, Yassine and Pinho, Joana (2020) Collusion between two-sided platforms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 72 (n° 102656).

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656


We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: September 2020
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Amsterdam
Uncontrolled Keywords: Collusion, Two-sided markets, Cross-group externalities
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 28 Jul 2020 09:34
Last Modified: 16 Jul 2021 08:17
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:124476
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41720

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