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Lefouili, Yassine
and Pinho, Joana
(2020)
Collusion between two-sided platforms.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 72 (n° 102656).
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Abstract
We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2020 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Collusion, Two-sided markets, Cross-group externalities |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2020 09:34 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Jul 2021 08:17 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:124476 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41720 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Collusion between two-sided platforms. (deposited 24 Apr 2018 11:10)
- Collusion between two-sided platforms. (deposited 28 Jul 2020 09:34) [Currently Displayed]
