Lefouili, Yassine and Pinho, Joana
(2020)
Collusion between two-sided platforms.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 72 (n° 102656).
This is the latest version of this item.
Preview |
Text
Download (726kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Date: | September 2020 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Collusion, Two-sided markets, Cross-group externalities |
JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2020 09:34 |
Last Modified: | 16 Jul 2021 08:17 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:124476 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41720 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Collusion between two-sided platforms. (deposited 24 Apr 2018 11:10)
- Collusion between two-sided platforms. (deposited 28 Jul 2020 09:34) [Currently Displayed]