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He, Yinghua
and Magnac, Thierry
(2017)
Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets.
TSE Working Paper, n. 17-870, Toulouse
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Abstract
A matching market often requires recruiting agents, or ``programs,'' to costly screen ``applicants,'' and congestion increases with the number of applicants to be screened. We investigate the role of application costs: Higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programs; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with different application costs. Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2017 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, Costly Preference Formation, Screening, Stable Matching, Congestion, Matching Market Design |
| JEL Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D50 - General D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis I21 - Analysis of Education |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Apr 2018 08:04 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Nov 2022 15:16 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32279 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25787 |
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