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He, Yinghua
and Magnac, Thierry
(2022)
Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets.
The Economic Journal, vol. 132 (n° 648).
pp. 2918-2950.
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Abstract
A matching market often requires recruiting agents, or ‘programmes’, to costly screen ‘applicants’, and congestion increases with the number of applicants to be screened. We investigate the role of application costs : higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programmes; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism with different application costs.
Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2022 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, Costly Preference Formation, Screening, Stable Matching, Congestion, Matching Market Design |
| JEL Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D50 - General D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis I21 - Analysis of Education |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Nov 2022 12:40 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2023 15:26 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:127505 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/46436 |
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Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets. (deposited 17 Apr 2018 08:04)
- Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets. (deposited 18 Nov 2022 12:40) [Currently Displayed]
