Gehrlein, William, Le Breton, Michel and Lepelley, Dominique (2017) The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting. Social Choice and Welfare, 49. pp. 315-321.
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Abstract
The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | 2017 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Condorcet, Separable preferences, Logrolling, Vote Trading |
JEL Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 13 Apr 2018 08:11 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:57 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32039 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25685 |
Available Versions of this Item
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The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting. (deposited 24 Jan 2017 10:46)
- The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting. (deposited 13 Apr 2018 08:11) [Currently Displayed]