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Bardey, David
, De Donder, Philippe and Mantilla, Cesar
(2017)
How Is the Trade-off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing?: Theory and Experiment.
TSE Working Paper, n. 17-777, Toulouse
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Abstract
We compare two genetic testing regulations, Disclosure Duty (DD) and Consent Law (CL), in an environment where individuals choose to take a genetic test or not. DD forces agents to reveal the test results to their insurers, resulting in a discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an experiment. We obtain that a larger fraction of agents test under CL than under DD, and that the proportion of individuals preferring CL to DD is non-monotone in the test cost when adverse selection is set endogenously at its steady state level.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Sub-title: | Theory and Experiment |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | March 2017 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Consent Law, Disclosure Duty, Personalised Medicine, Test take up rate, pooling health insurance contracts |
| JEL Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Mar 2017 14:48 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Apr 2024 11:33 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31557 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23204 |
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- How Is the Trade-off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing? (deposited 17 Mar 2017 14:48) [Currently Displayed]
