Bardey, David, De Donder, Philippe and Mantilla, Cesar (2019) How is the Trade-off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing? Theory and Experiment. Journal of Health Economics, 68. p. 102223.

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Abstract

We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic
tests, Disclosure Duty and Consent Law, and we run an experiment in order
to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policyholders’ welfare under the two regulations. Disclosure duty
forces individuals to reveal their test results to insurers, exposing them to a
discrimination risk. Consent law allows them to hide any detrimental information, resulting in adverse selection. The experiment results in much lower
genetic tests take-up rates with Disclosure Duty than with Consent Law,
showing that subjects are very sensitive to the discrimination risk. Under
Consent Law, take-up rates increase with the adverse selection intensity. A
decrease in the test cost, and in adverse selection intensity, both make it
more likely that Consent Law is preferred to Disclosure Duty.

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• How Is the Trade-off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing? (deposited 17 Mar 2017 14:48)
  • How is the Trade-off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing? Theory and Experiment. (deposited 27 Aug 2019 09:25) [Currently Displayed]