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Guigou, Jean-Daniel, Lovat, Bruno
and Treich, Nicolas
(2016)
Risky Rents.
TSE Working Paper, n. 16-710, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31097
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a symmetric contest game in which agents compete to increase their share of a risky rent. We show that a symmetric equilibrium always exists, and that it is unique under constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. We then exhibit interpretable conditions so that increases in risk and risk aversion decrease equilibrium e§orts in this strategic game
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2016 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2016 13:50 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Apr 2024 11:57 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31097 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22432 |
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