Guigou, Jean-Daniel, Lovat, Bruno and Treich, Nicolas (2017) Risky Rents. Economic Theory Bulletin, 5 (2). pp. 151-164.

This is the latest version of this item.

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number : 10.1007/s40505-016-0109-9


We consider a strategic contest game in which risk-averse agents exert efforts to increase their share of a risky rent. We show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists under constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. We also show that agents exert in general less efforts when they are more risk averse or when the rent is more risky.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 2017
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Contest, Rent seeking, Risk, Risk aversion, Shared rents
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 17 Oct 2016 13:45
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2024 11:56
OAI Identifier:

Available Versions of this Item

View Item