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Guigou, Jean-Daniel, Lovat, Bruno
and Treich, Nicolas
(2017)
Risky Rents.
Economic Theory Bulletin, 5 (2).
pp. 151-164.
This is the latest version of this item.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31096
Identification Number : 10.1007/s40505-016-0109-9
Abstract
We consider a strategic contest game in which risk-averse agents exert efforts to increase their share of a risky rent. We show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists under constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. We also show that agents exert in general less efforts when they are more risk averse or when the rent is more risky.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2017 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Contest, Rent seeking, Risk, Risk aversion, Shared rents |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2016 13:45 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Apr 2024 11:56 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31096 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22431 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Risky Rents. (deposited 17 Oct 2016 13:50)
- Risky Rents. (deposited 17 Oct 2016 13:45) [Currently Displayed]
