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Kojima, Fuhito and Yamashita, Takuro
(2016)
Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency.
TSE Working Paper, n. 16-677, Toulouse
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Abstract
We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism which satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium as the numbers of the buyers and sellers become large. Our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2016 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Double auction, interdependent values, multi-unit demand and supply, ex post incentive compatibility, asymptotic efficiency |
| JEL Classification: | D44 - Auctions D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jul 2016 13:35 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:53 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:30563 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22236 |
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