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Dubois, Pierre
and Vukina, Tomislav
(2008)
Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data.
IDEI Working Paper, n. 393
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/3384
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2008 |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law L51 - Economics of Regulation |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 05:52 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:34 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:3384 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2144 |
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