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Dubois, Pierre
and Vukina, Tomislav
(2009)
Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27 (n°4).
pp. 489-552.
This is the latest version of this item.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/10806
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.01.001
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2009 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing L51 - Economics of Regulation Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 05:52 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:34 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:10806 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2139 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:52)
- Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:52) [Currently Displayed]
