Dubois, Pierre and Vukina, Tomislav (2009) Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27 (n°4). pp. 489-552.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.01.001
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2009
Refereed: Yes
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
L51 - Economics of Regulation
Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:52
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:34
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:10806
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2139

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