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He, Yinghua, Miralles, Antonia, Pycia, Marek and Yan, Jianye (2015) A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-601, Toulouse
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Abstract
We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2015 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Priority-based allocation, Efficiency, Stability, Incentive Compatibility, Pseudo-Market Approach |
| JEL Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information I29 - Other |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Nov 2015 15:10 |
| Last Modified: | 22 May 2019 13:08 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29715 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18583 |
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