He, Yinghua, Miralles, Antonio, Pycia, Marek and Yan, Jianye (2018) A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10 (3). pp. 272-314. (In Press)

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Identification Number : 10.1257/mic.20150259


We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: August 2018
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Priority-based allocation, Efficiency, Stability, Incentive Compatibility, Pseudo-Market Approach
JEL Classification: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
I29 - Other
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 13 Apr 2018 09:14
Last Modified: 27 Oct 2021 13:37
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32109
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25711

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