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Lerner, Josh
and Tirole, Jean
(2015)
Standard-Essential Patents.
Journal of Political Economy, 123 (3).
pp. 547-586.
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Abstract
A major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex-ante not that important may, by being included into a standard, become standard-essential patents (SEPs). In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most standard-setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms. Such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to intense litigation activity. This paper builds a framework for the analysis of SEPs, identifies several types of inefficiencies attached to the lack of price commitment, shows how structured price commitments restore competition, and analyzes whether price commitments are likely to emerge in the marketplace.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | June 2015 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Standards, licensing commitments, standard-essential patents, royalty stacking, FRAND, hold ups and reverse hold ups |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:50 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:49 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28556 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16595 |
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Standard-Essential Patents. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:39)
- Standard-Essential Patents. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:50) [Currently Displayed]
