Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean (2013) Standard-Essential Patents. TSE Working Paper, n. 13-441, Toulouse

There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of wp_tse_441_v3.pdf]
Download (696kB) | Preview


A major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex-ante not that important may, by being included into a standard, become standard-essential patents (SEPs). In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most standard-setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms. Such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to intense litigation activity. This paper builds a framework for the analysis of SEPs, identifies several types of ine¢ ciencies attached to the lack of price commitment, shows how structured price commitments restore competition, and analyzes whether price commitments are likely to emerge in the marketplace.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 5 November 2013
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Standards, licensing commitments, standard-essential patents, royalty stacking, FRAND, hold ups and reverse hold ups
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:39
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:48
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:27714
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15762

Available Versions of this Item

View Item


Downloads per month over past year