Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean
(2013)
Standard-Essential Patents.
TSE Working Paper, n. 13-441, Toulouse
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Abstract
A major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex-ante not that important may, by being included into a standard, become standard-essential patents (SEPs). In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most standard-setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms. Such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to intense litigation activity. This paper builds a framework for the analysis of SEPs, identifies several types of ine¢ ciencies attached to the lack of price commitment, shows how structured price commitments restore competition, and analyzes whether price commitments are likely to emerge in the marketplace.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | 5 November 2013 |
Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Standards, licensing commitments, standard-essential patents, royalty stacking, FRAND, hold ups and reverse hold ups |
JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:39 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:48 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:27714 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15762 |
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