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Le Breton, Michel
and Van Der Straeten, Karine
(2014)
Influence Vs. Utility in the Evaluation of Voting Rules: A New Look at the Penrose Formula.
TSE Working Paper, n. 14-511, Toulouse
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Abstract
In this paper, we clarify the relationship between influence/power measurement and utility measurement, the most popular two social objective criteria used when evaluating voting mechanisms. For one particular probabilistic model describing the preferences of the electorate, the so-called Impartial Culture (IC) model used by Banzhaf, the Penrose formula show that the two objectives coincide. The IC probabilistic model assumes that voter preferences are independent. In this article, we prove a general version of the Penrose formula, allowing for correlations in the electorate. We show that in that case, the two social objectives no longer coincide, and qualitative conclusions can be very different.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2014 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Power measurement, Voting, Random electorates |
| JEL Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:49 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Apr 2024 06:46 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28364 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16540 |
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- Influence Vs. Utility in the Evaluation of Voting Rules: A New Look at the Penrose Formula. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:49) [Currently Displayed]
