Le Breton, Michel and Van Der Straeten, Karine (2015) Influence versus utility in the evaluation of voting rules: a new look at the Penrose formula. Public Choice, vol. 165 (n° 1). pp. 103-122.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
In this paper, we present a contribution to the analysis of the relationship between influence/power measurement and utility measurement, the two most popular social objective criteria used when evaluating voting mechanisms. For one particular probabilistic model describing the preferences of the electorate, the so-called impartial culture (IC) model used by Banzhaf, the Penrose formula shows that the two objectives coincide. The IC probabilistic model assumes that voter preferences are independent and neutral. In this article, we prove a general version of the Penrose formula, allowing for preference correlations and biases in the electorate. We use that formula to illustrate, for a spectrum of well-known probabilistic models, how the divergence between the two social objectives impacts the ranking and performances of the voting mechanisms.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Date: | 6 November 2015 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Power measurement, Voting, Random electorates |
JEL Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 09 Nov 2015 10:02 |
Last Modified: | 30 Nov 2023 08:16 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29888 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18653 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Influence Vs. Utility in the Evaluation of Voting Rules: A New Look at the Penrose Formula. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:49)
- Influence versus utility in the evaluation of voting rules: a new look at the Penrose formula. (deposited 09 Nov 2015 10:02) [Currently Displayed]