Acconcia, Antonio, Immordino, Giovanni, Piccolo, Salvatore and Rey, Patrick (2013) Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy. TSE Working Paper, n. 13-403

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Abstract

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the
introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main
determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using
data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by
the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and
enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests
that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.

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• Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:36) [Currently Displayed]
  • Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:51)