Acconcia, Antonio, Immordino, Giovanni, Piccolo, Salvatore and Rey, Patrick (2014) Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 116 (4). pp. 1116-1159.

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Identification Number : 10.1111/sjoe.12080


We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the
introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main
determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using
data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by
the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and
enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests
that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 2014
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Accomplice-witness, Criminal Organizations, Leniency, Whistleblowing
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:51
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:49
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