Acconcia, Antonio, Immordino, Giovanni, Piccolo, Salvatore and Rey, Patrick (2014) Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 116 (4). pp. 1116-1159.
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Abstract
We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the
introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main
determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using
data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by
the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and
enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests
that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | October 2014 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Accomplice-witness, Criminal Organizations, Leniency, Whistleblowing |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:51 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:49 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28662 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16614 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:36)
- Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:51) [Currently Displayed]