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Bobtcheff, Catherine, Bolte, Jérôme
and Mariotti, Thomas
(2015)
Researcher's Dilemma.
TSE Working Paper, n. 13-377, Toulouse
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Abstract
We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ¯ght for priority.
Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas
mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher,
symmetric environment, the resulting preemption game has a unique equilibrium. We
study how the shape of the breakthrough distribution affects equilibrium maturation
delays. Making researchers better at discovering new ideas or at developing them has
contrasted effects on the quality of research outputs. Finally, when researchers have
different innovative abilities, speed of discovery and maturation of ideas are positively
correlated in equilibrium.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 28 September 2015 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Academic Competition, Preemption Games, Private Information |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:32 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:47 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:26783 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15506 |
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