Vertical Foreclosure and Multi-Segment Competition

Jullien, Bruno, Reisinger, Markus and Rey, Patrick (2018) Vertical Foreclosure and Multi-Segment Competition. Economics Letters, vol. 169. pp. 31-34.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (122kB) | Preview
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32737

Abstract

This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tariffs, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: August 2018
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Foreclosure, Vertical Contracting, Customer Segments, Downstream Competition
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
K21 - Antitrust Law
L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 22 Jun 2018 15:27
Last Modified: 28 Jun 2019 14:54
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32737
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26097

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year