Tools
Tools
Hörner, Johannes
and Renault, Jérôme
(2026)
Titre : A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring.
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 236.
This is the latest version of this item.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/132146
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106227
Abstract
We provide a Folk theorem for finitely repeated games under imperfect public monitoring, under a strengthening of the standard assumptions required for finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, and of those for discounted repeated games under imperfect public monitoring. Our proof uses standard recursive methods and assumes the existence of a public randomization device. Three counterexamples show in which sense our assumptions are tight.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2026 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Finitely repeated games, Public signals, Public randomization device |
| JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Sep 2026 12:46 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Sep 2026 12:51 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132146 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/53997 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring. (deposited 27 Sep 2023 08:05)
- Titre : A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring. (deposited 23 Sep 2026 12:46) [Currently Displayed]
