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Cornière, Alexandre de
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9835-3992, Jerath, Kinshuk and Taylor, Greg
(2026)
Seller-Side Tying of Platform Services.
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1733, Toulouse
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Abstract
This paper analyzes seller-side tying on digital platforms, where access to a
core intermediation service is conditioned on sellers using an ancillary service (e.g.,
fulfillment or payments). We model a monopoly platform matching consumers
and competing sellers across many product categories, with consumers valuing
the ancillary service heterogeneously. When adoption is voluntary, sellers under
adopt because asymmetric adoption creates vertical differentiation that softens price
competition, raising prices and reducing platform participation. Tying restores high
adoption, intensifies competition, and increases consumer surplus. A ban on tying
or structural separation lowers adoption and can harm consumers.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | April 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Apr 2026 08:23 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Apr 2026 08:23 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:131671 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/53170 |
