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Lukyanov, Georgy
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X and Vlasova, Anna
(2026)
Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice.
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1715, Toulouse
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Abstract
We develop a tractable career–concerns model of expert recommendations with a continuous private signal. In equilibrium, advice obeys a cutoff rule: the expert recommends the risky option if and only if the signal exceeds a threshold. Under a mild relative–diagnosticity condition, the threshold is (weakly) increasing in reputation, yielding reputational conservatism. Signal informativeness and success priors lower the cutoff, while stronger career concerns raise it. A success–contingent bonus implements any target experimentation rate via a one–to–one mapping, providing an implementable design lever.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | February 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | career concerns, expert advice, reputational incentives, information design, experimentation |
| JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Feb 2026 07:29 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Feb 2026 08:26 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:131439 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/52079 |
