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Guillouet, Louise and Martimort, David
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703
(2026)
Institutional Design For Environmental Acts.
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1705, Toulouse
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Abstract
This paper develops a model of niche lobbying in which interest groups endogenously specialize in the acquisition of distinct types of policy-relevant information. Contrary to the view that niche strategies are chosen to soften competition and secure autonomy, we show that specialization arises as a self-enforcing equilibrium even though groups would prefer to compete over the same informational dimensions. The mechanism is demand-driven: when information acquisition is private and nonverifiable, the decision-maker’s inference from silence intensifies informational pressure on specialized groups, increasing the burden of information acquisition. We discuss the implications of these results for interest groups influence in climate and biodiversity policy.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | January 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Lobbying, Information Acquisition, Niche Expertise, Hard Information Communication, Specialization |
| JEL Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Feb 2026 07:41 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Feb 2026 07:42 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:131356 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51946 |
