Bontems, PhilippeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-4725-540X, Calmette, Marie-FrançoiseIdRef and Martimort, DavidIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703 (2026) Highway to sell: How to renew concessions if you want it. Economics of Transportation, vol.45.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.ecotra.2026

Abstract

Motivated by the forthcoming terminations of most highways concessions in France, we propose a versatile model of dynamic regulation and contract renewals that describes a long-term relationship between the public authority and an incumbent operator with private information about its costs that may face potential entrants. We discuss various issues including the nature of discriminatory biases towards entrants, their consequences on investments, the public or private nature of the management of concessions, the role of the operator’s financial constraints, the consequences of allotments. So doing, we isolate a few principles that should guide policy-makers when deciding upon concession renewals.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: March 2026
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Amsterdam
Uncontrolled Keywords: Procurement, Concession contracts, Contract renewal, Highways, Transportation Auctions, Asymmetric information
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D86 - Economics of Contract - Theory
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L91 - Transportation - General
L98 - Government Policy
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Mar 2026 08:59
Last Modified: 18 Mar 2026 08:59
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:131303
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51898

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