Tools
Tools
Jeon, Doh-Shin
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9381-8412, Lefouili, YassineORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4966-7212 and Madio, Leonardo
(2025)
Platform Liability and Innovation.
, n. 22-1361, Toulouse
(In Press)
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Abstract
We study a platform’s incentives to remove IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for such infringements on innovation and welfare. We first show that platform liability can lead to either higher or lower commission rates, depending on how screening affects transaction volume. We then show that liability may spur or hinder innovation, depending on the intensity of cross-group network externalities. A sufficient condition for platform liability to reduce total welfare is that it lowers innovation, in which case all market participants–the platform, innovators, imitators, and buyers—are worse off. We also provide a sufficient condition under which platform liability raises total welfare.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2025 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Platform, Liability, Intellectual Property, Innovation. |
| JEL Classification: | K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability K40 - General K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure - Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Nov 2025 07:13 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Nov 2025 07:13 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:131104 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51656 |
