Tools
Tools
Smolin, Alexey
and Yamashita, Takuro
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2008-8375
(2025)
Information Design in Smooth Games.
TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1671, Toulouse
Preview |
Text
Download (792kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of ac-tions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. Building on this result, we characterize optimal information struc-tures in symmetric linear-quadratic games. With common values, targeted disclosure is robustly optimal across all priors. With interdependent and normally distributed values, linear disclosure is uniquely optimal. We illustrate our findings with applications in venture capital, Bayesian polarization, and price competition.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2025 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Bayesian persuasion, information design, dual certification, first-order approach, linear-quadratic games, targeted disclosure, Gaussian coupling, linea, disclosure. |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2025 11:28 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Oct 2025 11:28 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130998 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51257 |
