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Tirole, Jean
and Bénabou, Roland
(2025)
Laws and Norms.
European Journal of Political Economy.
(In Press)
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Abstract
We analyze how private decisions and optimal public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences, material incentives, and social norms. We show how honor and stigma interact with incentives and derive optimal taxation. We then analyze the expressive role of law as embodying society’s values and identify when it calls for a weakening or a strengthening of incentives. The law should be softened when it signals agents’ general willingness to contribute to the public good and toughened when it signals social externalities. We also shed light on norms-based interventions, societies’ resistance to economists’ messages, and the avoidance of cruel and unusual punishments.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | motivation, incentives, social norms, expressive law |
| JEL Classification: | D64 - Altruism D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information H41 - Public Goods K1 - Basic Areas of Law K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Oct 2025 06:43 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Oct 2025 06:58 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130959 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51231 |
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Laws and Norms. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:21)
- Laws and Norms. (deposited 23 Oct 2025 06:43) [Currently Displayed]
