Nocke, Volker and Rhodes, AndrewIdRef (2025) Optimal Merger Remedies. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1660, Toulouse

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Abstract

We develop a framework to study horizontal mergers when the parties can propose remedies to an antitrust authority. Remedies are modeled as asset divestitures, which make the firm receiving the assets more efficient at the expense of the merged firm. We consider both the case where the merger affects a single market and where it affects multiple markets. Solving for the merging firms’ optimal proposal, we investigate when it involves remedies—and if so, which assets should be divested, and to whom, and how this depends on market characteristics such as the level of competitiveness.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: August 2025
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Antitrust, horizontal mergers, structural remedies, divestitures, data
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L40 - General
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 15 Sep 2025 07:46
Last Modified: 15 Sep 2025 12:31
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:130888
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51174
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