Bontems, PhilippeIdRef, Calmette, Marie-FrançoiseIdRef and Martimort, DavidIdRef (2025) Highway to Sell. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1652, Toulouse

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Abstract

Motivated by the forthcoming terminations of most highways concessions in France, we propose a versatile model of dynamic regulation and contract renewals that describes a long-term relationship between the public authority and an incumbent operator with private information about its costs that may face potential entrants. We discuss various issues including the nature of discriminatory biases towards entrants, their consequences on investments, the public or private nature of the management of concessions, the role of the operator's financial constraints, the consequences of allotments. So doing, we isolate a few principles that should guide policy-makers when deciding upon concession renewals.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: July 2025
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Procurement, concession contracts, contract renewal, highways, transportation, auctions, asymmetric information
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D86 - Economics of Contract - Theory
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L91 - Transportation - General
L98 - Government Policy
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 04 Jul 2025 06:54
Last Modified: 04 Jul 2025 06:54
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:130653
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50972
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