Bontems, Philippe, Calmette, Marie-Françoise
and Martimort, David
(2025)
Highway to Sell.
TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1652, Toulouse
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Abstract
Motivated by the forthcoming terminations of most highways concessions in France, we propose a versatile model of dynamic regulation and contract renewals that describes a long-term relationship between the public authority and an incumbent operator with private information about its costs that may face potential entrants. We discuss various issues including the nature of discriminatory biases towards entrants, their consequences on investments, the public or private nature of the management of concessions, the role of the operator's financial constraints, the consequences of allotments. So doing, we isolate a few principles that should guide policy-makers when deciding upon concession renewals.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | July 2025 |
Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Procurement, concession contracts, contract renewal, highways, transportation, auctions, asymmetric information |
JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D86 - Economics of Contract - Theory L51 - Economics of Regulation L91 - Transportation - General L98 - Government Policy |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 04 Jul 2025 06:54 |
Last Modified: | 04 Jul 2025 06:54 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130653 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50972 |