Bobtcheff, Catherine, Levy, Raphaël and Mariotti, Thomas (2021) Information disclosure in preemption races:Blessing or (winner's) curse? TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1202, Toulouse

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Abstract

Firms receiving independent signals on a common-value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner-take-all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especially when competition is severe. When firms strategically select their disclosure policies, a moderate subsidy for disclosure induces a low correlation between firms’ policies, and thus maximizes welfare.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: April 2021
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 May 2025 08:18
Last Modified: 06 Nov 2026 14:28
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:130544
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50840

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