Bisceglia, Michele and Padilla, A. Jorge (2022) On sellers' cooperation in hybrid marketplaces. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 32 (N° 1). pp. 207-222.

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Identification Number : 10.1111/jems.12498

Abstract

Hybrid marketplaces, such as Amazon's and Zalando's stores or Apple's and Google's app stores, which distribute their own products and services in competition with those of third-party sellers, play a significant and growing role in the internet economy. This paper shows that such platforms react by lowering the fees charged to sellers and the prices charged to consumers in response to cooperation agreements between third-party sellers: horizontal mergers or collusive agreements. It also shows that cooperation can be pro-competitive when the platform is a vertically integrated gatekeeper, adopts the agency business model, is a close competitor to the third-party sellers it hosts, and observes (or correctly anticipates) the third-party sellers' agreement. The discussion here is of significant policy relevance, since third-party sellers in online marketplaces may find it easier to collude and they may respond to the bargaining power of certain gatekeeper platforms by merging their activities.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 12 September 2022
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Maiden
Uncontrolled Keywords: Antitrust, Collusion, Mergers, Hybrid Marketplace.
JEL Classification: L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; Warehousing; e-Commerce
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 03 Feb 2025 07:36
Last Modified: 11 Feb 2025 13:25
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:130286
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50359
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