Bisceglia, Michele (2023) The unbundling of journalism. European Economic Review, Vol. 158 (104532).

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104532

Abstract

Due to the switching behavior of online consumers, news outlets increasingly compete with each other to attract audience for each single news item they produce, rather than for complete editions of their newspapers: the so called unbundling of journalism. Using a standard Hotelling model, I show that online competition unambiguously reduces news articles’ quality, as compared to the scenario in which outlets compete to sell their newspapers (content bundles) to single-homing consumers. The unbundling of journalism also dampens outlets’ newsgathering activities when their ideological positions are relatively unimportant from consumers’ viewpoint. In this case, consumers are worse off in the online market for news, even though they consume more articles and have low disutility from switching.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: September 2023
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Amsterdam
Uncontrolled Keywords: Online news, Unbundling, News quality, Newsgathering
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L82 - Entertainment; Media (Performing Arts, Visual Arts, Broadcasting, Publishing, etc.)
L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 03 Feb 2025 07:28
Last Modified: 11 Feb 2025 15:05
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:130278
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50352
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