De Donder, PhilippeORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4159-3263, Llavador, Humberto
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4058-7486, Penczynski, Stefan
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5477-6830, Roemer, John E.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9049-5083 and Vélez-Grajales, Roberto
(2025)
Nash versus Kant: A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior.
Journal of Economics, N° 145.
pp. 97-128.
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Abstract
The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is ndividualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | 19 April 2025 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Additional Information: | En attente de pubbli pour bascule vers HAL. AT, le 27/01/2025 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Kantian equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, measles vaccination, free-rider problem |
JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games D62 - Externalities D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement I12 - Health Production - Nutrition, Mortality, Morbidity, Suicide, Substance Abuse and Addiction, Disability, and Economic Behavior |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jan 2025 15:40 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2025 13:12 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130136 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50196 |
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Nash versus Kant: A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior. (deposited 04 Jan 2022 08:06)
- Nash versus Kant: A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior. (deposited 27 Jan 2025 15:40) [Currently Displayed]