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Auriol, Emmanuelle
and Dahmani-Scuitti, Anaïs
(2025)
Decentralization in Autocraties.
TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1609, Toulouse
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Abstract
In a model featuring two regions—one affluent and the other impoverished—the allocation of public spending is examined under an initially centralized and autocratic political process. In a stable autocracy, the decision to implement decentralization reforms hinges on a tradeoff: while centralization enables the autocrat to extract higher rents, it also results in reduced productivity in the poor region. The autocrat opts for decentralization when the negative impact on productivity outweighs the benefits of rent extraction. Moreover, under the pressure of democratic movements and growing instability, an authoritarian regime may also pursue decentralization reforms to preserve its wealth from the decisions of the poor median voter.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | January 2025 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Autocracy, Decentralization, Democratization |
| JEL Classification: | D02 - Institutions - Design, Formation, and Operations D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries P48 - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2025 10:18 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Jan 2025 10:18 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130116 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50116 |
