Farhi, Emmanuel and Tirole, Jean (2025) Too Domestic to Fail: Liquidity Provision and National Champions. Review of Economic Studies, vol.92 (n°1). pp. 268-298.

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Identification Number : 10.1093/restud/rdae028

Abstract

Authorities’ support policies shape the location and continuation of industrial and banking activity on their soil. Firms’ locus of activity depends on their prospect of receiving financial assistance in distress and therefore on factors such as countries’ relative resilience. We predict that global firms are global in life and national in death; and that they become less global when competition is more intense, times are turbulent, and international risk sharing (say, through swap lines) weak. We analyse the competitive benefits of industrial and banking policies as well as their limitations, such as currency appreciation.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: January 2025
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Oxford
Uncontrolled Keywords: Economic geography, national champions, cross-border banking, liquidity support, too domestic to fail, home bias, exhorbitant duty, hegemon
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
G15 - International Financial Markets
G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 17 Jan 2025 09:24
Last Modified: 17 Feb 2025 09:10
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:130106
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50103
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