Farhi, Emmanuel and Tirole, Jean
(2025)
Too Domestic to Fail: Liquidity Provision and National Champions.
Review of Economic Studies, vol.92 (n°1).
pp. 268-298.
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Abstract
Authorities’ support policies shape the location and continuation of industrial and banking activity on their soil. Firms’ locus of activity depends on their prospect of receiving financial assistance in distress and therefore on factors such as countries’ relative resilience. We predict that global firms are global in life and national in death; and that they become less global when competition is more intense, times are turbulent, and international risk sharing (say, through swap lines) weak. We analyse the competitive benefits of industrial and banking policies as well as their limitations, such as currency appreciation.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | January 2025 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Place of Publication: | Oxford |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Economic geography, national champions, cross-border banking, liquidity support, too domestic to fail, home bias, exhorbitant duty, hegemon |
JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions G15 - International Financial Markets G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2025 09:24 |
Last Modified: | 17 Feb 2025 09:10 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130106 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50103 |