Ivaldi, Marc, Petit, Nicolas and Unekbas, Selçukhan (2024) Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from European Merger Cases. Antitrust Law Journal, vol.86 (n°2). (In Press)

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Abstract

• The killer acquisitions theory states that established firms buy new businesses to pre-empt future competition, particularly in the pharmaceutical and digital industries. The theory fuels demand to make merger policy more restrictive.
• But is the theory of killer acquisitions supported by empirical facts?
• Focusing on past investigations by the European Commission in information technology industries, this article studies whether acquisitions by large technology companies reduce competition by eliminating future rivalry.
• Despite the small sample size, the findings suggest that none of the reviewed transaction was followed by the disappearance of the target’s products, a weakening of competing firms, and/or a post-merger lowering or absence of entry and innovation.